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 PPPs have been increasingly used on the last couple of decades as a financing 
instrument, especially in what concerns investments on big infrastructure. The financial 
capability of private partners, and the fact that a PPP brings risk sharing possibilities and 
usually defers the costs of an investment through multiple generations have been some of the 
main points of interest. Additionally, using private management on public infrastructure also 
usually has the objective of benefiting from the private sector expertise and efficiency.  
Portugal is not different, and on the last few years, PPPs have been a really hot topic, 
since its utilization has been majorly considered as an off balance sheet financing scheme for 
all the governments. The performance of these PPPs is debatable, and a large discussion on 
the costs these projects have for taxpayers has been installed. Risk assessment has also been 
debated, since evidence shows that he risks are not being shared on the optimal proportion, 
with current benefit for the private parties. However, the main focus of PPPs in Portugal has 
been dedicated to transport concessions, and also health facilities, as two examples.  
 The Portuguese water sector
1
 has been having private participation for some years 
now, but in a method a bit different from the usual PPP instalment for infrastructure 
investment. Whereas PPPs are usually a conglomerate of private companies organized to 
develop a certain project, on the water sector, the PPP methodology used is one of 
concessions.  
 Therefore, the importance and scepticism about PPPs on the Portuguese context, and 
also the impact that the water sector has on the daily life of all people were the main 
motivations to pursue the study of this topic. 
 The international experience of private participation on the water sector has also been 
a subject of some research and mixed conclusions. All throughout the world there are some 
                                                        
1 We will refer to “water sector” throughout the text, but the industry under analysis is much broader than just 
water. The firms engaged in these services are suppliers of household water and/or domestic wastewater 
treatment and/or solid household waste management. We will analyze firms that deal directly with households at 
a municipal level, which we refer to as “retailers” or “downstream”, and firms that act as wholesalers for the 
municipalities, which we refer to as “wholesalers” or “upstream”. In Portugal, the largest player in these several 
industries is Águas de Portugal, which explains the association with the “water sector”. 
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different private participation models, but at the time there conclusive and solid evidence is 
lacking on which one is the best management model for the water sector – public or private.  
 Given the mixed findings on private participation on the global water sector, 
performance evaluation and drivers came up as an interesting topic for analysis. 
Scope of analysis 
 The objectives of this study are mainly two. The first one is to assess which are some 
of the potential drivers for increased performance on this particular sector. To reach this 
objective the first step is the usage of an evaluation methodology to classify the performance 
of the concessions (public and private) working on the Portuguese water sector. After this 
step, choosing potential variables whose impact might be relevant for the study and 
performing the adequate statistical processes to evaluate their impact. 
 A second objective is to assess and to add evidence to the discussion on which one is 
the best management model for the water sector – public or private. Furthermore, the analysis 
will be more directed to finding which model provides the best service to the customer, not 
only which model is financially more stable. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Introduction to Public Private Partnerships 
 The concept of Public Private Partnerships is broad and difficult to exactly define. 
Several descriptions have been made in the past few years, by multiple authors and 
organizations. The OECD defines PPPs as “an agreement between the government and one or 
more private partners (which may include the operators and the financers) according to which 
the private partners deliver the service in such a manner that the service delivery objectives of 
the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private partners and where the 
effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners.”.  
 Yascombe (2007) defines some generic attributes of PPPs, compiling a definition of PPPs 
as: a long term contract between a public sector and private sector party, for the design, 
construction, financing, and operation of public infrastructure by the private-sector party, with 
payments over the life of the PPP Contract to the private-sector party for the use of the 
Facility, made either by the public-sector party or by the general public as users of the 
Facility, and with the Facility remaining in public-sector ownership, or reverting to public-
sector ownership at the end of the PPP Contract.  
 Generally speaking, it is possible to define PPPs as a long-term agreement in which a 
private sector entity is contracted by the public sector to provide a service widely accepted as 
a public good. 
 The tasks of the private partner are defined in the contract, but usually comprise the 
financing, construction and operation of the facilities, at least for a determined period of time. 
Nevertheless, the state still possesses some power over the ruling of the infrastructure. The 
financial gain for the private partner comes either from receiving service fees from the 
government, or by charging directly the users. In some cases, there might also be a 
combination of both schemes (OECD, 2011). 
 In the same document published by the OECD, we can read “The effectiveness of the 
alignment depends on a sufficient and appropriate transfer of risk to the private partners.” 
This provides evidence that for a successful PPP to arise, the main factor is a correct transfer 
of risk among the public and private partners. 
 In terms of water sector PPPs in Portugal, we can see some of these characteristics: long 
term contracts, mainly used for operational purposes, regulated and controlled by state 
authorities, and where the risk transfer has not always been considered the best. 
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Why incur in PPPs? 
 
 There are several reasons for Governments to adopt the PPP option. However, 
according to Grimsey and Lewis (2005), the main reason is of course to deliver higher value 
for money in these projects, compared to the service if offered by the public sector, especially 
due to the efficient transfer of risks between partners. 
 The expertise that the private sector brings to the project is also valued. Management 
skills, and also more efficiency and effectiveness on the provision of services are critical 
aspects in the option for a private partner (McQuaid & Scherrer, 2009). This is even more 
relevant when the public sector has a widely accepted image of being a less effective services 
provider, when compared to private companies, usually with projects with longer completion 
times and costs. Even though the provision of public goods must be analysed with different 
patterns, the public sector does not have the best of reputations in what concerns effectiveness 
of service provision and project management.  
 Other motives emerge as possible drivers for PPPs. The pressure of the private partner 
to secure profits, and therefore efficiency gains might lead to innovations in the area that 
otherwise would not be funded. Moreover, PPPs can be used as a way to provide a benchmark 
in terms of performance to the public sector. In this case, PPPs are used to provide a model 
for public projects in the same area. By using this, the state gets a benchmark in terms of 
effectiveness and budget management, transferring than this knowledge to the fully public 
projects. This model is being used in Norway, for example (Yascombe, 2007). 
 Another advantage that a PPP contract brings is that it allows the capital cost of the 
facility to be dispersed all along the life of the project, instead of being immediately allocated 
to Governmental budgets (Yascombe, 2007). This is especially appealing to European Union 
countries, after the budget deficit limits imposed to them by the Maastricht Treaty. This 
specification of a PPP contracts has also raised some issues related to the purpose of PPPs. As 
Bovaird (2004) states, “Of course, this gives rise to the possibility that these partnerships have 
not been marriages based on love, or even on respect for the qualities each could bring to the 
relationship, but rather marriages for money.”. The fact that PPPs present themselves as a 
good opportunity for off-budget financing is an important issue to evaluate the true intentions 
of the design of a PPP project.  
 In the Portuguese case of water PPPs, we might argue that at some extent the benefit 
of private expertise has been important, since many municipalities don’t have the business 
knowledge to run a water system. Nevertheless, given the country experience with PPPs, the 
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public opinion tends to consider that the off-public budget financing, has been a decisive 
motive for PPPs incurrence in Portugal, especially due to shortage of public funding, allied 
with electoral pressure for infrastructure development. 
 
PPPs on the Water Sector 
 
 The water sector presents in its core characteristics a number of specifications that 
make it a really special case. Quoting OECD (2000), “Water is a basic human need, and an 
economic good, a volatile mix”. The social factor and need for universal access in water 
distribution is undeniable, and a source of discussion in reference to private sector 
participation. 
 According to Gassner, Popov and Pushak (2009), the water sector is, in its majority, a 
natural monopoly, as well as a source of externalities. Additionally, the demand is somehow 
inelastic, which brings enormous pricing power to the provider, all reasons that have been 
used to justify public management in the past.    
 On the International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin (1992), 
participants classified water as a “as an economic good, i.e., a commodity that should be 
priced at its cost of provision (including environmental externalities) and its true value to 
society”.(Ouyahia, 2006) Water also closes an important paradox: Public authorities have to 
ensure the financial incentives and attractiveness for the private party, especially due to the 
high and irreversible level of investments needed, as well as provide sufficient regulation to 
protect customers from monopoly abuse. The regulatory burden is even more important when 
taking into account that if demand becomes stagnant, financial recovery for the partner 
becomes essentially dependent on price increases (Ouyahia, 2006). 
 The only possible source of competition for PPPs in the water sector is regarding the 
attribution process of concessions or other contracts. Usually, the more competitive the 
bidding process, the more efficient the overall future result tends to be. Nevertheless, even in 
those processes, a lack of competitive environment has been noticed. First of all, there is the 
need for a policy of total transparency by the public sector, to avoid asymmetries of 
information towards future partners. Additionally, the high costs of setting a bid usually end 
up excluding smaller companies from the process. For example, as mentioned by Ouyahia, 
each company bidding for the Buenos Aires concession reportedly spent an average of 2,5 
million USD in setting up the bid, whereas in the case of Manilla, these costs raised up to 5 
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million USD. These high costs have are a possible trigger for non-competitive/corruptive 
behaviors on the bidding process (Ouyahia, 2006). 
In the particular case of the water sector in Portugal, the closest we get to these issues 
would be to analyze and discuss the governance and the background of the main player in the 
industry: Águas de Portugal, which is a state owned holding of companies dominating the 
industry, especially when it comes to upstream. 
Models of Private Sector Participation in the Water Sector 
 In the spectrum of private sector participation in the water sector
2
, two main models 
have been dominant in terms of study and application. One is the model of full privatization 
of ownership and management, implemented in England and Wales. The second is the model 
of delegated management observed in France. This model functions on a base of lease and 
concession contracts, with public ownership but mixed management. This last one has been 
promoted by the World Bank as model of development, and therefore replicated on several 
developing countries (Ouyahia, 2006). Other models of water sector development have been 
tested around Europe, with highlights to the Dutch model, of total absence of private 
participation (Prasad, 2006). 
 Results from these two main experiences have been mixed. In England and Wales, 
despite the full privatization in 1989, the involvement of the public sector had to come 
extensively in other ways. An extensive regulatory system was created to protect the 
customer, and at the end, more regulation ended up being imposed, instead of the de-
regulation that a complete openness to the private sector would promise at the beginning 
(Bakker, 2003).  
 In England and Wales several researches show that in the first years, water charges for 
customers increased continuously, and in parallel, water companies’ profits increased in a 
range between 50% and 700%, as well as the salaries of managers. At first sight, it seemed at 
the time that tariff increases were only used to increment profits and also to finance the 
expansion of water sector holding companies to other sectors (Seppälä, Hukka, Katko, 2001). 
Other studies from the English case have also proven that leakage rates increased after the 
privatization, in some cases at 40% levels, due essentially to under-investment in the 
structures, leading to water waste and risk in drought situations (Bakker, 2003). 
                                                        
2 Here water sector excludes the solid waste management and relates solely to water supply and wastewater 
management. 
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 In the French case, the output has been a bit more positive. French water sector 
companies have built a reputation and dimension based on the successful domestic case. 
Nevertheless, some problems still arose. The decentralization of power to municipalities 
raised several regulation issues, with problems such as corruption, water contamination and 
increased fees being reported. Additionally, the low negotiating skills of municipal power 
officials contributed to less positive deals, and consequently, a shake in the public private 
harmony (OECD, 2000). 
 The relative success of the French case is corroborated by the fact that the model has 
been replicated in several developing countries, and also due to the fact that two of the biggest 
references in water services provision worldwide (Veolia and Suez) are originally French. 
 In the particular case of Portugal we see evidence of several different models in place. 
The fact that the main mainstream player (AdP) remains in the sphere of the state owned 
companies mixes the existing model significant into something hybrid between the French 
and the Dutch models. In the event of a full privatization of AdP we may even move to 
something close to the English-Welsh model. 
Overall Impact and Performance of PPPs in the Water Sector 
 Notwithstanding all the specifications of the water sector mentioned above, it still has 
remained attractive for private sector participants. Despite the big investments needed to build 
a network, private companies usually perceive some aspects for fast change in public water 
companies, which customarily translate into efficiency and monetary gains. Improving 
customer records, billings and collections, together with better management of water 
treatments and unaccounted water (leaks plus illegal connections) are regularly fast ways of 
cutting costs and boosting revenues, therefore contributing easily to an improved financial 
record (OECD, 2000). 
 Gassner, Popov and Pushak (2009), studied several examples of private sector 
participations in the water sector, and derived some conclusions. In their study, the authors 
calculated that, on average, the private sector companies were responsible for an increase in 
12% in residential connections, a 41% increase in daily water service, and considerable 
increases in various labour productivity ratios. However, the authors point that much of this 
enhanced productivity comes from considerable layoffs. On the studied cases, the average 
workforce on water companies gradually decreased by 22% after some years of private sector 
entrance.  
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Marin (2009) analysed a set of PPPs on the water sector of developing countries. 
Marin observed, in the majority of cases, reduction on water losses, in some cases even to 
levels matching up with the best performing water utilities in developed countries. An overall 
increase on the performance in terms of bill collection was also noticed, corroborating the 
above-mentioned arguments. In terms of labour productivity, once again evidences of 
increase after private action were found. In the case of developing countries, increases in 
productivity came from extension of customer bases, but also due to layoffs. Marin states 
“Many of the utilities concerned were overstaffed, and PPP projects were often accompanied 
by significant layoffs, ranging from 20 percent to 65 percent of the initial labor force. The 
layoffs were often motivated not just by overstaffing but also by the need to change the 
overall profile of employees and to hire more skilled staff.” 
In terms of tariffs, Gassner, Popov and Pushak (2009) find no evidence of systematic 
increase in residential prices, or at least no differences between the cases of private and public 
sector management. For Marin (2009), with the sample from developing countries, data was a 
bit different. Significant tariff increases were found, but the author states that “analyzing the 
impact of PPPs on tariffs can be easily misleading, because it is heavily dependent on 
prevailing tariff policies. Tariff increases are not necessarily a bad thing for customers when 
they also translate into wider access to better services, as happened under many PPPs.”. 
Additionally, many governments had a record of providing water at below-cost levels, either 
by social or political reasons (OECD, 2000). Taking this into account, tariff analysis must be 
done carefully, since price increases are not necessarily applied just with an “extra-profit” 
motivation, but sometimes for a matter of sustainability and as a result of increased service 
levels. Tariffs are highly dependent on the policy previous to PPP, the cost-recovery level, 
and also the potential efficiency gains that the private operator is able to achieve (Marin, 
2009). 
 Regarding investment, the impact of PPPs seems to be more dubious. Gassner, Popov 
and Pushak (2009) found no evidence of increased levels of investment coming from private 
partners.  
 Experience with PPPs has shown that the initial focus on potential private financing 
was wrong. Private operators have been successful in improving service and operational 
efficiency, what ends up having an indirect effect on financing, since it potentially increases 
revenues and profits, therefore increasing the credit profile towards possible lenders. 
Nevertheless, this advantage could emerge even if the water companies were still in public 
hands. No clear advantage has showed up just based on ownership differences (Marin, 2009). 
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 Additionally, especially in emerging countries, PPPs have failed to fully provide the 
agreed levels of investment on utilities. Furthermore, in some cases where reasonable levels 
of investment have been made, a big stake has been financed by public grants. The case of 
developing countries is very relevant for investment analysis, because there are immense 
infrastructure needs and social goals tied up with water distribution, which cannot be 
exclusively financed with cash flow from operations, as corroborated by difficult cases such 
as the Buenos Aires and La Paz (Marin, 2009).   
 PPPs in the water sector have in fact gathered mixed reports. Prasad states that despite 
the apparent operational gains, cases of bribery, corruption, non-compliance with contractual 
goals, together with layoffs, tariff increases and pollution have been reported, usually leading 
to premature renegotiations. Some factions start defending that a successful service is not 
dependant on ownership (public vs. private), but decisively on the efforts made to sustain 
financial viability, even when in public control (Prasad, 2006).  
 
Performance measures in water sector PPPs 
 
In terms of performance measurement and analysis, several methodologies can be 
used. Yardstick comparison is of course the most utilized, comparing data from one PPP to 
the other. Nonetheless, it is not straightforward at all. Factors such as topography, population 
density and social stratus can influence performance of water utilities. Some of the basic 
factors used for performance evaluation are product price, leakage levels, as well as 
investment expenditures (Ouyahia, 2006). 
Chong et all (2006) use as a basic tool the above mentioned factors, but decompose 
expenditures on infrastructure on maintenance and expansion of network, to differentiate.  
Marin (2009) also uses several indicators to perform the PPP analysis on developing 
countries. Water losses, collection rates, tariff levels and labor productivity (staff per 
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Gassner, Popov and Pushak (2009) use multiple indicators to access the performance 
of water companies. Amongst all of them, the following are highlighted: 
 
 Residential connections  Collection rate 
 Water sold per connection  Water lost in distribution 
 Employees  Hours with water daily 
 Water sold per worker  Capex per worker 
 Residential connections 
per worker 
 Average residential tariff 
 Residential coverage  
 
PPPs in the water sector – the Portuguese case 
 
 The Portuguese case in water PPPs presents an interesting case. In the last decade, the 
Portuguese water sector suffered an enormous expansion in terms of coverage, reaching 
nowadays pretty much the entire population. Nevertheless, the managing structure did not 
always set the same pace of development. Problems with water losses, bad allocation of staff, 
inadequate tariff systems and ineffective management are still on the agenda. The challenge in 
the water sector has passed from extending coverage to upgrading efficiency and performance 
(Cruz and Marques, 2012). 
In Portugal, PPPs in the water sector can be created using essentially two legal and 
organizational frameworks – concessions or mixed capital companies. Concessions 
correspond to the usual term, and mixed capital companies are companies where the public 
sector has the majority of the capital, but there is also a private shareholder, usually with a 
non-controlling but big share of the company (Marques and Silva, 2008). 
 The sector of water distribution has a really low level of horizontal integration. To 
serve a population of around 10 million people in terms of water distribution, there are around 
300 entities, all throughout national territory. From these 300 entities, less than 20 serve more 
than 100 thousand inhabitants, and more than 100 cover a population inferior to 10 thousand 
people, giving a good notion of the low integration patent on the sector (Cruz and Marques, 
2012). 
 A big problem that has emerged in the water sector in Portugal is essentially linked to 
the low horizontal integration. Municipalities have the control of management of water 
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distribution, and are also responsible for launching the individual PPP program. A problem 
emerges because municipalities usually launch these programs and open the water distribution 
systems to private partners on a situation of almost despair. Consequently, the due diligence 
process is often not well performed, and important measures such as the public sector 
comparator are left out of the analysis. This rudimentary analysis process has harsh 
consequences, because it leads usually to a choice of a proposal that is not the best, 
influencing the future financial sustainability of the water utilities. The efficient level of risk 
sharing amongst public and private partners is also usually not achieved, with clear prejudice 
to the public (Marques and Silva, 2008). 
 The bidding processes are usually long (average of 21 months) and costly. The 
average number of bidders for each utility has been of 4 on the past, and big international 
players are usually on the contest. Nevertheless, municipalities usually do not have the 
resources to deal with such complex bidding processes. The tight budgets compel 
municipalities to hire inexperienced and low cost consultants, usually politically aligned with 
the mayor’s team, ending up in a completely biased selection process. Some cases of players 
lobbying municipal power have also been suggested (Berg and Marques, 2010). 
 The fact that local municipalities, with low management expertise, see themselves 
negotiating with big national and international consortiums is already a dangerous factor. The 
potential private partners are way more experienced, and the negotiation gap usually biases 
the selection and contractual processes as well. A proof of badly negotiated contracts is the 
fact that in Portugal pretty much all water sector PPPs have already been renegotiated, some 
of them 3 or 4 times. Renegotiations usually even start at very early stages of the contract. 
“The main reasons for renegotiation are the volume of consumption (or wastewater much 
lower than what was initially forecasted (optimism bias), change of the investment plans 
(unilateral change by the sponsor), change in law, change of the “bulk” water price and 
change of the scope and PPP object, among other factors” (Cruz and Marques, 2012). 
 In Portugal, even despite sufficient proof of badly designed deals and poor monitoring 
by the local power, no sanctions have been filled. Even despite all the evidence against PPPs 
in the water sector in Portugal, these mistakes occur essentially on the planning stage. The 
outcomes and performance from private partners have been positive, usually performing 
better than public ones (Berg and Marques, 2010). 
 Nevertheless, a cautious approach must be made. Private partners perform better than 
public ones, but the record of public companies is not perfect, so the standard of comparison 
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is not high enough. The Portuguese water sector seems to be performing well, the question 
being now on how much better could it perform if properly managed and institutionalized.  
 
3. The Portuguese Water Sector 
Introduction 
 
 The water sector of a determined country is a vital part of its development and quality 
of life. In 2010, the General Assembly of the United Nations declared that the access to 
potable water and to a proper wastewater system were vital rights in order for individuals to 
have quality of life and to enjoy all the other basic human rights. This clearly illustrates the 
importance of this sector for a country, and for the life of all populations. 
 Given this importance, these services are usually labelled as strategic public goods, 
with economic interest. In Portugal, the law
3
 defines water services as essential public 
services.  
 Like all public goods, managing a water system is a complex task. The water services, 
as a public good, must fulfil the requirement of universality in terms of distribution, at 
reasonable prices and rates, respecting the socio-economical paradigm of the country, since it 
possesses an important status in terms of social balance. Furthermore, this sector naturally 
creates monopoly power, and is considered as capital intensive, with long maturities in terms 
of return on investment, which adds even more speciality to its management. 
 In Portugal, this sector witnessed a big expansion in the last couple of decades, 
imposed mostly by the EU Directives on water supply and sanitation, with many of the 
management entities having resources that match the excellence levels of other European 
countries. This expansion has been coordinated by domestic strategic plans for the sector, 
such as the PEAASAR II, occurring from 2007 to 2013.In the beginning of the 90s, the water 
system reached 80% of the Portuguese population, and in 2011 those figures reached the level 
of 95%. In terms of water quality, in the year of 1993, only 50% of the water available in the 
system was considered safe for consumption, whereas in 2011 that percentage reached 98%. 
In terms of the wastewater system, the coverage reaches 81% for the drainage of residual 
                                                        
3
 Essential Public Services Law - Lei dos Serviços Públicos Essenciais (Lei nº23/96, de 26 de Julho)   
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waters and 78% in the treatment of those same waters. The objectives for 2013 were to reach 
90% in both indicators. 
Services chain 
 The water sector in Portugal comprises three different sub-sectors. These sub-sectors 
are the distribution of water to the public, the wastewater system, and also the waste 
management services. All three of the sub-sectors have a chain of processes. These processes 
are divided in the “upstream” and “downstream” stages. The upstream stages are 
correspondent basically to the wholesaler, or bulk, being the downstream stages 
correspondent to the retailer. 
 The stages are the following: 
 Drinking water supply service 
o Upstream – Groundwater abstraction, treatment, elevation, adduction 
o Downstream – Storage, distribution, consumption  
 Wastewater management service 
o Upstream – Elevation, transport, treatment, rejection 
o Downstream – Discharge, drainage, retention 
 Waste management services 
o Upstream – Organic recovery/recycling, incineration, landfill 
o Downstream – Waste production, Municipal waste collection / Separate 
collection 
 
Summarizing, it is possible to see that in the drinking water supply services the 
upstream phases comprise the steps going from the extraction until the public network, being 
the downstream stages responsible for storage and distribution. 
In the wastewater management service, the downstream stages are correspondent to 
the collection of wastewater from the general public until the transfer to appropriate facilities. 
In these facilities, the water is treated and given a proper destination. 
Regarding the waste management services, the case is similar. Downstream stages 
include waste production and collection, upstream stages contain all the processes responsible 
for recycling or proper rejection of the items in question. 
The terms “upstream” and “downstream” in the last two sub-sectors may be misleading, as 
the “downstream” stages are delivering wastewater and solid waste to the “upstream” stages 
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respectively. However, if you think of services being provided at a wholesaler and retailer 
scale then the terms become more intuitive even in these cases. 
Organizational structure of the services 
 All the services mentioned above are organized regarding the entity that is responsible 
for managing them.  
 In fact, a multiplicity of agents coexists on the Portuguese water sector, in order to 
assure a continuous provision of water and complementary services. 
 At a more broad level we have the Central Administration, or government branches, 
together with the regulatory agency – ERSAR. These agencies are responsible for legislation 
and regulation of the sector. In terms of management of the water system, municipalities play 
a big role, together with municipal associations and municipal and intermunicipal companies. 
In Portugal, municipalities are responsible for the management of the water services, and also 
for its concession, if that is the local decision. 
 Also in the management level of the water infrastructure, other companies exist. 
Public companies sometimes are awarded with the concession, but there are also private 
partners in charge in some municipalities. The law
4
 allowed the entrance of private partners 
on the capital structure of water distribution companies in 1993. The presence of private 
players occurs mainly on the downstream part of the water sector. The upstream faction of 
water collection is usually awarded to public companies, but still there are some exceptions, 
as Águas da Serra (owned by AGS, a private group), Águas do Vouga or Tratave (both 
controlled by Aquapor). The downstream market is easier to enter for private parties. 
Upstream facilities are even more demanding in terms of capital than downstream, which 
creates additional entry barriers. Additionally, upstream companies are responsible for serving 
several downstream companies and consequently a large costumer basis. Given this, the 
regulatory system itself imposes limitations for private participation at this level, since it’s 
easier to control and regulate the system while holding the upstream sector. One extra factor 
for a less open upstream sector compared to the downstream sector is that to enter in the 
downstream distribution, companies have to negotiate with municipalities, which have the 
power to attribute the governance of local water management. For the upstream sector, it is a 
different scenario, since a lot of municipalities are involved, and the negotiation would have 
to pass through the state holding company Águas de Portugal. 
                                                        
4 Law number and reference: “Decreto-Lei nº372/93, de 29 de Outubro”  
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 On the urban waste sector, the upstream faction is more dispersed in terms of 
ownership. Associations created by groups of municipalities own several of the local 
companies. Nevertheless, recently it was announced that EGF, a sub-holding company from 
Águas de Portugal for the management of the urban waste sector, has been sold to a private 
consortium, indicating an additional opening for private parties on the sector. 
 This brief introduction about the players in the water sector provides a good panorama 
about the difficulties of managing such a complex and fundamental service. Amongst the 
several management entities there are enormous differences in scale, resources but also 
management system. This heterogeneity brings several issues in terms of management and 
regulation.  
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4. Methodology and Data Description 
 
 The purpose of this study was to assess the impact of some variables in the 
performance of concessions on the Portuguese water sector, ultimately trying to find possible 
drivers for success in terms of water sector PPPs. Given that this sector in Portugal has private 
and public participation, another objective was to evaluate what was the best management 
model (public vs. private or mixed). Therefore, the first step was to develop an evaluation 
method for the performance of the concessions, followed by choosing some potential 
important variables, being the last stage the assessment of their importance for the 
performance, by using regression analysis. 
 
Concession Evaluation Method 
 
 The evaluation method for the concessions was the basis for the rest of the work. The 
scores achieved in this model would be the components of the dependent variable necessary 
to the subsequent regression analysis. 
 The starting point for the model was the concession evaluation model developed by 
the Centre for Applied Studies of Catolica Lisbon School of Business and Economics (CEA, 
2008), as part of the work developed by this Centre regarding the study of Public Private 
Partnerships.   
 Nevertheless, due to the time elapsed since the model was created, and also due to 
some specifications wanted for this study, the initial model was slightly changed. 
 Giving this, the model was altered and based on two major sets of indicators. First, 
financial indicators, to measure the financial balance of the company responsible for the 
provision of water and waste management services. Second, a set of indicators was used, 
majorly to estimate the quality and sustainability of the service provided to the client. The two 
scores (financial performance and quality of service) were computed independently and on a 
yearly basis, and then weighted, to reach the final score of the performance of the water 
company. The weights used were 40% to the financial performance and 60% to the quality 
and sustainability of the service. This last part had a higher score because even though this 
study’s objective was to assess the performance of the water services providers, it was more 
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focused on assessing the advantages for the client of public/private management of water 
services. 
 Each indicator used was measured in different units and scales so, using some criteria, 
all of them were transformed to correspond to a 1 to 5 score. Finally, with all the 
variables filled, a final score was computed, also in a 1 to 5 scale, being 1 the lowest score 
possible and 5 the highest score possible. For the most part, the same methodology used in the 
original study was used (CEA, 2008). 
 One of the objectives while building a model was that it could be used in future 
occasions, easily updated, and that the information used would be standardized and publicly 
and easily available. Consequently, the vast majority of the information contained in the 
model was present on RASARP, a periodic report issued by the Portuguese regulatory agency 
for the water sector ERSAR (RASARP, 2007 to 2012). 
In terms of financial information, some ratios and useful data were used, whereas in 
terms of quality and sustainability the information used in the model was part of a set of 
evaluation criteria published on the above mentioned RASARP. The selected variables were 
used in the model based on some criteria. Some of them were already part of the initial model, 
mainly in the financial side. On the quality and sustainability part, the differences to the 
original study were bigger. The majority of the variables were chosen by the impact that their 
performance has on the customers. Also, the choice of a great part of these variables was 
backed by the findings made in the Literature Review of this same thesis. On this Literature 
Review, some performance impacting variables were more consensual. Therefore, while 
building the model that served as basis for this thesis, some indicators were chosen to reflect 
these same impacting variables, to already incorporate the findings of previous studies. For a 
complete list of all the metrics used on the model, see Table 15. 
In terms of sample, a 5-year sample was chosen to conduct this work, corresponding 
to the years of 2007 to 2011. 2011 was the last chosen year because the last report issued by 
ERSAR only covers until that year. So, 5 years worth of data for every player on the water 
sector, whose desired information was available, were computed. A window of 5 years was 
chosen not only because it would already give a good overall sample, but also because 
complete information prior to 2007 was not as complete, reliable and easy to access, 
especially due to the changes in the number of entities operating.  
On total, samples from 103 companies on the Portuguese water sector were collected. 
On this total number, 45 companies are on the upstream sector and 58 on the downstream. 
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Even taking into account some shortages of information that did not allow the collection of 5 




 As explained above, two scores were computed for each company, in each one of the 
years of analysis – a quality score and a financial score. These two scores combined ended up 















































Graph/Table 3 – Descriptive statistics for Overall Performance 
 
 Briefly analysing the data patent above, it is possible to see that at an overall level, the 
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whereas for the quality performance the paradigm is slightly different.  Companies that are 
part of the sample performed better in financial terms that in providing a quality service to 
customers, corroborating the differences between the variables, and the greater attention to the 
quality performance. 
Independent Variables 
 Using the evaluation model described above, a final performance score was built for 
every one of the 103 companies above mentioned, for every one of the years for which 
information was available.  
 With all the available information on the sector, the next task was to choose the 
variables whose impact to assess on the overall performance of the water companies. Taking 
into account some of the findings of the literature review and the information that was 
accessible about the sector, the final list of variable was: 
 
 Period of concession (years) 
 Remaining years of concession (years) 
 Nº of contractual changes 
 Public vs. Private management (dummy variable) 
 Area served (km2) 
 Nº of residences served (000) 
 Urban vs. Rural areas served (dummy variables) 
 Price Score 
 Productivity (Percentile) 
Period of concession 
 This variable contains the information regarding the total period of concession, in 
years, for the water services providers (initial period plus extensions, when existent). These 
contracts are, in their majority, long time contracts, therefore being no surprise on the 
maximum and average number of years. 
 The main purpose of this variable was to analyse first of all if there was a relation 
between the contract length and performance and, if existent, what kind of contracts (longer 
vs. shorter) brings the greatest performance in terms of water services provision. 
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Standard Deviation 6,92 
Maximum 50,00 
Minimum 15,00 
Graph/Table 4. Descriptive analysis for the Period of Concession in years 
 
Remaining years of concession  
 This variable has data on the remaining years of the concession contracts for every 
company, on the 5 years of data collected. In other words, how many years until the contract 
ends. The objective of this variable was to assess if the simple passing of time could serve as 
a performance enhancer. More specifically, if the fact that companies are more experienced 
every year brings some benefits in terms of performance, or even if, on the other side, 



















Period of concession 
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Standard Deviation 9,14 
Maximum 50,00 
Minimum 5,00 
Graph/Table 5. Descriptive analysis for the remaining years of concession 
 
Number of contractual changes  
 The number of times the initial contract has been renegotiated. Does not include all 
kinds of renegotiations, but rather is focused on contract extensions. The objective of this 
variable was to draw conclusions on the effect of contract extensions on performance, if an 
extension increases the confidence in the company and boosts performance or, on the other 
hand, if it has a relaxing effect and harms the overall performance. 
Average 0,388199 
Standard Deviation 0,601435 
Maximum 2 
Minimum 0 
0 Contractual Changes 217 
1 Contractual Change 85 
2 Contractual Changes 20 
 
Table 6. Descriptive analysis for the number of contractual changes 
Public vs. Private Management 
 This one is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if the company is publicly 
managed or 0 if a private party is responsible of the management. The purpose here was to 
once again answer the question of if there is a preferable management method in terms of 
performance delivery on the water sector. 
Observation from Public 
Management Companies 
Observations from Private 
Management Companies 
189  133 
 
Table 7. Amount of public and private companies on sample  
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 Area served by the water company, measured in squared kilometres (km
2
).  The drive 
for this variable was to evaluate if there is any relation between the areas supplied by one 
company and its performance. From this relation, important conclusions can be drawn in 









Graph/Table 8. Descriptive analysis for the area served 
Number of residences served  
 Number, in thousands (000), of homes in the area served by the company. Aligned 
with the Area served variable, this variable also takes into account population density trough 
the number of houses.  
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Standard Deviation 215,44 
Maximum 1.142,00 
Minimum 1,50 
Table 9. Descriptive analysis for the number of residences served 
 
Urban vs. Rural areas served 
 This variable is divided into 3 dummy variables. The regulatory board ERSAR 
divided the Portuguese territory in 3 areas: 
 APU – Urban Areas 
 AMU – Median Urban Areas 
 APR – Rural Areas 
Using that information, 3 dummy variables were created – APU, AMU and APR. In each 
one of them, the value 1 means that the company’s operation area includes regions in that 
area. The value zero means the opposite, that the company’s operating territory does not 
include any terrains with that classification. Since the companies can operate in more than one 
type of areas, the three dummies are required to capture all possibilities (there are three 
instances of area accumulation in the entire sample of 152 entities). 
These variables emerge as complementary to the two variables mentioned above. Despite 
area and number of residences being already a possible indicator of level of urbanization, 
these variables add some interest. There are big differences in terms of water supply for a big 
population on a small area or in a big area. Serving a city needs a more concentrated structure, 
whereas serving big rural areas needs different infrastructure, in which the financial return on 
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investment is not as high. For example, taking water to more isolated places may mean having 
to build pipes on difficult terrains, necessity to elevate the water, and therefore spend more 
energy on transport, amongst other things that might impact the overall performance. 
The data for this variable was only published to companies that serve the downstream water 
sector, and therefore the analysis on this variable was only made regarding those companies.  
 Total 
APU (Urban areas) + 38 
AMU (Medium Urban areas) + 77 
APR (Rural Areas) + 40 
Total number of entities sampled (*) 152 
(*) there are 3 entities operating simultaneously in two urbanization levels. 
Table 10. Entities operating in different urbanization levels  
 
Price Score  
 Being price such an important variable on the performance of a company, it could not 
be left out. Nevertheless, comparing prices on such a varied pool of companies presented 
some challenges. 
 First of all, upstream and downstream companies do not have the same kind clients. 
Upstream companies usually sell to downstream companies, and downstream companies 
usually sell to the final customer. The volumes sold are also different. Finally, the units of 
measure for water companies are different of those for waste management companies, as well 
as the prices.  
 In order to have the largest possible sample, there was a need for a way of ensuring 
comparable information.  
 In this work, the solution found was to develop a price score variable. The tariffs for 
each service that each company provides were computed, and then 5 percentiles (20% 
intervals) were calculated for every service’s tariffs (upstream or downstream water 
distribution, sanitation or waste management). With the percentiles calculated, the next step 
was to compute in which percentile every tariff sample was in its service group. A score of 1 
was attributed to the first percentile (lowest prices), a score of 2 to the second percentile, and 
so on until 5, that represented the highest prices. Finally, an average of the company’s tariffs 
percentiles was computed, being that the final prices score for that company, in that year.  
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 Since the percentiles were calculated individually for every above mentioned service, 
and the tariff by itself is not used as method for analysis, this method ensures the 
comparability of prices. Despite not comparing the individual tariffs directly, this variable 





Standard Deviation 1,31 
Maximum 5 
Minimum 1 
Graph/Table 11. Descriptive analysis for the Price Score 
 
Productivity  
 For this analysis, productivity was simply calculated as Activity Level divided by the 
number of workers. Due to the differences in measurement units, and consequently activity 
levels, between companies of the water and urban waste sector, a percentile method was also 
used in this case. 
 First of all, the productivity for every sample was calculated. The next step was to 
calculate the percentiles for each group (water and waste, both upstream and downstream). 
Using this methodology, we are not comparing productivity by itself directly, but grouping 
the companies on intervals and scaling them from the most productive to the least. In this 
case, due to the amplitude of productivity levels, even amongst companies of the same 
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than classified with a score of 1 to 10, being 1 the group with the least productive firms and 
10 the most productive firms.  
 After the percentile characterization, each sample has a sort of “productivity score”, 
based on the group of origin, either water or urban waste, upstream or downstream, to serve 
as a comparison method. 
 This measure of productivity was the chosen one for some reasons: First of all, it 
offers a reliable and simple method of comparison amid companies of the water sector. 
Second, it includes in its simple calculation two variables – activity level and number of 
workers – which are very important when analysing the performance of companies. 
Furthermore, due to the above mentioned differences in scale and measurement units between 
companies, both these variables would also need some transformation in order to be used 
when comparing companies. This productivity measure therefore simplifies the process, while 
including information from both variables. The choice for not using revenues in the 
productivity analysis was also based on the fact that the tariffs charged throughout the country 
for the same services are fixed and considerably different, and not dependant exclusively on 
the cost structure. Given this, using the revenues as a variable for calculating productivity 
could possibly bias the analysis on this matter. Even though the chosen method for 
productivity calculation doesn’t capture the possible differences in productivity inherent to 
the different sectors (water vs. urban waste), it ends up capturing the effect of the 
appropriateness of the human resources structure, to the usual activity level of the company.   
 Activity level is of course important, because it is the most direct indicator for a 
company’s size and also gives important information regarding its the financial strength. The 
number of workers is also a good indicator of size of the company, and also suitability and 
sustainability of Human Resources and recruitment policies.   
 In the literature review findings, this was an important variable to analyse, hence it 
was included in this analysis. This variable brings additional value to the discussion of who is 
the best manager of water companies, private or public entities. Supposedly, one of the 
biggest advantages that private management brings to the water sector is the enhanced staff 
productivity, measured like in this work, even though this many times happens due to massive 
layoffs. On the other hand, the public sector is usually associated with some benevolence in 
terms of human resources, with public companies frequently having staff in excess, therefore 








 To best find the actual impact of the above-mentioned variables on the performance of 
companies on the water sector, the chosen method was regression analysis.  
 In order to have the most complete possible set of conclusions, a set of 9 regressions 
was computed. On these nine cases, 3 different dependent variables were used. The first one 
was the global performance of the company as measured by the evaluation model described 
earlier on this chapter. This final performance score was the combination was two sub-scores, 
a financial one, and a quality and sustainability one. Those individual scores, financial 
performance and quality and sustainability performance were the two other dependent 
variables used. For the purpose of this thesis, the analysis of the combined scores but also the 
individual ones seemed important, not only due to the main objective of analysing which 
governance model is better for the client, but also to find if the independent variables have 
different impacts on the financial and quality side. 
 For each one of the 3 dependent variables, 3 regressions were computed. The first one 
with the global data, including upstream and downstream companies, and then individual 
ones for both those sub-sectors. Because of some slight differences on the dynamics of the 
upstream and downstream sectors, the impact of some variables on the performance of 
companies on each one of the sectors could potentially differ, therefore the separation of the 
global performance for further analysis.  
 As independent variables, all the variables on the section above were used for all 
regressions, with the exception of the APU, AMU and APR, which were used only for the 
regressions including the downstream sector companies. 
Detailing a bit more the regressions used, we ran performance indicators as dependent 
variables against all the described explanatory variables. We started with the general 
performance indicator: 
 
PERFit =  const + ß1 PCONCESSit + ß2 REMAINit + ß3 CHANGEit + ß4 PUBLICit + 
ß5 AREAit + + ß6 RESIDENCEit + ß7 PRODUCTit + ß8 PRICEit + errorit (1) 
 
PERFit is the performance indicator outlined previously, PCONCESSit is the 
concession duration, REMAINit is the remaining years of the contract, CHANGEit is the 
number of contractual changes, PUBLICit is the dummy on public vs private management, 
AREAit is the variable on the square kilometres served by each entity, RESIDENCEit refers to 
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the number of residences, PRODUCTit and PRICEit refer to the productivity and score price 
indicators created. 
We expect longer contracts to perform better and the performance to improve with the 
passing of the years (which actually means a negative predictive sing on the REMAIN 
coefficient). We find contradictory explanations for the number of contractual changes: on the 
one hand, we can expect that worse performing contracts to have more changes in the 
contracts, on the other hand, contractual changes may help fix what was originally poorly 
done. Larger areas will make performance harder, but more residences would help financial 
performance. Better productivity (higher score) and better price (lower score) will enhance 
financial performance. 
 
We next regressed similar regressions on FINANCIAL and QUALITY sub-indices: 
FINit = const + ß0 QUALit + ß1 PCONCESSit + ß2 REMAINit + ß3 CHANGEit + ß4 
PUBLICit + +ß5 AREAit + + ß6 RESIDENCEit + ß7 PRODUCTit + ß8 PRICEit + 
errorit (2) and 
QUALit = const + ß0 FINit + ß1 PCONCESSit + ß2 REMAINit + ß3 CHANGEit + ß4 
PUBLICit + +ß5 AREAit + + ß6 RESIDENCEit + ß7 PRODUCTit + ß8 PRICEit + 
errorit (3). 
 
FINit indicates the financial performance index explained previously, while QUALit 
indicated the quality of service indicator.  
The hypotheses formulated postulate that on regression (2) the financial performance 
will depend positively on the quality of service, as a better service will lead to a better 
financial compensation. On regression (3), we test the reverse implication, which is likely 
more plausible, namely that the quality of services will be better for firms who are financially 
sounder. The hypotheses formulated for the general PERF dependent variable, concerning the 
other explanatory variables hold for regressions (2) and (3) as well. 
Next we ran regressions separately on downstream and upstream entities. For the 
upstream firms the regressions used were exactly the same. But for the downstream entities, 
we added the urbanization areas served as described above.   
APUit is the dummy variable to analyse whether a company is servicing urban areas or 
not, whereas AMUit evaluates if a company is present in Medium Urban Areas. Finally, APRit 
makes an evaluation on the presence of rural areas on the company’s area of influence. 
 35 
João Gonçalo Ribeiro – Catolica Lisbon School of Business and Economics - 2014 
 
  
Since, as mentioned above, more populated areas are more prone to having a better 
financial performance, due to the higher customer base, but also to the lower tariffs associated 
with lower costs of bringing these services to a bigger amount of people, we expect the 
variable of urban areas to have a positive impact on performance. On the other hand, 
companies in rural areas are expected to perform at a worse level. 
Sometimes samples do not meet the assumptions required to perform complete 
regressions. To deal with this potential problem, robust regressions were computed (applying 
the robust function on Stata, the software used for data analysis and regression), in order to 
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5. Results Analysis 
 After computing the regressions mentioned on the Methodology chapter, the next step 
is to analyse those results and summarize the resulting conclusions. As said in the previous 
chapter, three main types of regressions were performed. The first including all the companies 
on the sample, and then two others, one with data exclusively from upstream companies and 
finally one with data only from downstream companies. The following results presentation 




Regression (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable PERF FIN QUAL 
Number of observations 274 274 274 
F-statistic 14.51 10.92 7.23 
R-squared 0.2665 0.2203 0.1847 
        
Constant 2,653*** 3,411*** 1,524*** 
QUAL   0,122*   
FIN     0,127* 
PCONCESS 0,046*** 0,019 0,057*** 
REMAIN -0,044*** -0,026** -0,048*** 
CHANGE 0,051 0,071 0,026 
PUBLIC -0,119 0,051 -0,219** 
AREA -0,0317** -0,047** -0,014 
RESIDENCE 0,3323 0,092 0,438 
PRODUCT 0,025** 0,028* 0,017 
PRICE -0,038 -0,079** 0,00017 
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 12:  refers to the coefficients and relevant statistics for the regressions (1), (2) and (3). PERF 
refers to a composite performance indicator mixing financial and quality of service subindices, QUAL 
refers to the quality of service performance subindex, FIN to the financial performance subindex, 
PCONCESS is the variable measuring total number of years in the contract, REMAIN is the 
remaining number of years, CHANGE is the number of contractual changes in the contract, PUBLIC 
is a dummy variable with the value of 1 for public, state-owned entities, AREA is the number 
kilometres (in 1000km2) served by the entity, RESIDENCE is the number of residences (in 1000) 
served, PRODUCT indicates the performance quintile in terms of productivity and PRICE indicates 
the performance decile in terms of a price score index. 
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 Analysing the results of the regressions performed for the global sample, the 
independent variables that show more promising explanatory potential are the period of 
concession and also the remaining years of concession. Both these variables are statistically 
significant in at least two of the regressions, with the remaining period of concession being 
significant in all three of them. The coefficient signs for these variables are the same as the 
ones initially expected. The initial period of concession displays a positive coefficient, 
meaning that longer periods of concession yield better performance levels in general. 
Relatively to remaining years of concession, the coefficient is negative, indicating that 
companies with fewer remaining years of concession have better performances.  
 The area of influence variable also showed up to be statistically relevant for both the 
general and financial performances, presenting for both a negative coefficient. Making once 
again the parallelism with the initial expectations, we can say that they are corroborated. 
Larger areas of influence mean additional costs in terms of water provision to more distant 
costumers, impacting the profitability of the water company. Being this a capital intensive 
industry, with conservation and reparation costs being an important part of the cost structure, 
a larger area to monitor harms the financial performance, and increases the cost per costumer, 
reducing profitability. 
 Aligned with the area of influence we have the productivity factor. As expected, more 
productive companies perform better in terms of overall and financial performance.  
 Also as expected, the price variable was significant in terms of financial performance, 
also aligned with the initial expectation that a lower price would yield a better performance, 
especially in financial terms. Water services are a volume industry, not a price one, and lower 
prices mean more volumes, improving performance. Furthermore, lower prices are often 
traditional of more densely populated areas, where the cost of bringing water to costumers is 
lower, as discussed above analysing the area variable.  
 An interesting turn of events is that productivity and price are not significant as 
explanatory variable for quality performance. Adding the fact that from this regression we can 
see with a statistically significant confidence that public companies perform better quality 
wise, and these regressions are aligned with some of the findings presented in the literature 
review. Public companies tend to supply better quality services, whereas private companies 
increase financial performance, usually leveraged by productivity increases, as a result of 
considerable layoffs. 
 Even with the greater percentage that quality performance has on the overall 
performance index, variables that are significant for financial performance are usually 
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significant for the overall performance, indicating that it is easier to improve considerably the 
financial performance, whereas quality gains are less noticeable and harder to achieve. 
Upstream Sample 
 
Regression (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable PERF FIN QUAL 
Number of observations 153 153 153 
F-statistic 13.66 16.55 5.09 
R-squared 0.3763 0.4455 0.2241 
        
Constant 2,816*** 5,308*** 0,954 
QUAL   0,026   
FIN     0,034 
PCONCESS 0,044** -0,04* 0,1*** 
REMAIN -0,044*** 0,001 -0,073*** 
CHANGE 0,035 0,312*** -0,157 
PUBLIC -0,113 0,02 -0,199 
AREA -0,0169 -0,034* -0,004 
RESIDENCE 0,3791 0,22 0,47 
PRODUCT 0,02 0,004 0,029 
PRICE -0,088*** -0,214*** 0,00379 
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 13:  refers to the coefficients and relevant statistics for the regressions (1), (2) and (3). PERF 
refers to a composite performance indicator mixing financial and quality of service subindices, QUAL 
refers to the quality of service performance subindex, FIN to the financial performance subindex, 
PCONCESS is the variable measuring total number of years in the contract, REMAIN is the 
remaining number of years, CHANGE is the number of contractual changes in the contract, PUBLIC 
is a dummy variable with the value of 1 for public, state-owned entities, AREA is the number 
kilometres (in 1000km2) served by the entity, RESIDENCE is the number of residences (in 1000) 
served, PRODUCT indicates the performance quintile in terms of productivity and PRICE indicates 
the performance decile in terms of a price score index. 
 
 The following regressions to be analysed are the ones containing exclusively the 
database of upstream companies.  
 At first, it is noticeable that the R-squared levels for these regressions are generally 
higher than the ones obtained with the global sample. Possibly the fact that in this group all 
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companies belong to the same fraction of the water sector and have more similar 
characteristics increases the explanatory potential of the data. 
 Once again, the variables related to the period of concession show interesting values in 
terms of significance.  The period of concession and remaining years of concession are 
significant and with the same coefficient signal as in the regressions for the global sample.  
For the financial performance, the period of concession shows a negative coefficient, possibly 
indicating that shorter periods of concession result in increased financial performance. 
Nevertheless, since this coefficient is only significant at 10% and shows an inverse signal to 
the ones obtained for the period of concession on all other regressions, its validity is 
questionable. 
 In these regressions, the number of contractual changes also showed up as a 
significant variable for the financial performance. Contractual changes in this case are 
essentially related to period of concession extensions, therefore having some connection in 
terms of conclusion potential with the variables connected with the period of concession. As 
said before, the expectation towards the number of contractual changes was hybrid, since 
more contractual changes might mean a worse performing contract and, at the same time, it 
might indicate that the initial mistakes were corrected. In this case the coefficient for this 
variable is positive, therefore indicating that more contractual changes increase the financial 
performance of companies. Making a comparison with the initial expectation, what we can 
say is that contractual changes, when applied, tend to increase performance, at least 
financially. 
 Coherently with the findings about area of influence achieved in the global sample 
regressions, this variable shows once again a significant coefficient with a negative signal, 
relevant for the financial performance. As discussed above, in a capital intensive industry 
such as the water sector, a larger area to monitor involves greater costs, and harms financial 
performance. There is also a probable connection with greater areas and level of urbanization. 
Greater areas might easily include rural areas to supply, where the costs per costumer of 
supplying water are greater, reducing the profit per costumer. In addition, rural areas also 
usually have higher tariffs, and at least looking at the results in terms of price score displayed 
in these regressions, a lower price seems to have a connection with increased productivity. 
 Continuing with the price subject, in the upstream sample the price score also shows 
interesting results. In the upstream sector, it seems that price is relevant for both financial and 
general performance, also with a negative coefficient, corroborating the initial findings that 
lower prices increase performance. In this case, the variables are significant for both financial 
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performance and general performance at a 1% level. Even with financial performance having 
a lower weight on general performance, the impact on financial performance of the price 
score was sufficient to also make in impact on the overall score, giving a coherent idea on 
how much the price score affects financial performance.  
 Once again, besides the period of concession and the remaining years of concession, 
little or no variables seemed to make a difference in terms of quality performance, whereas 
the findings for financial performance are more varied. Time does seem to have a big 
influence on quality performance. Longer concession periods seem to have positive impact, as 
well as fewer years remaining on the concession. In terms of concession period, a longer one 
might give the concessionary a greater availability to invest, since the period for returns is 
higher. Additionally, longer periods of concession allow for a more stabilized and solid 
structure. Regarding the remaining years of concession, one approach might indicate that as 
time passes by and companies become more experienced in managing their water sector 
customer base, the quality of the service provided increases. Another approach might suggest 
that as the time for a concession renewal arrives, companies increase performance, in order to 
have a more appealing status towards the entities approving the concessions.   
Downstream sample 
Regression (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable PERF FIN QUAL 
Number of observations 121 121 121 
F-statistic 2.58 5.66 3.64 
R-squared 0.2067 0.3862 0.2879 
        
Constant 1,921*** 1,945 0,522 
QUAL   0,344***   
FIN     0,414*** 
PCONCESS 0,047*** 0,056*** 0,006 
REMAIN -0,052*** -0,041*** -0,025* 
CHANGE 0,04 -0,246*** 0,263** 
PUBLIC 0,312 0,38 0,029 
AREA -0,0219 -0,106 0,067 
RESIDENCE -4,1329 1,548 -6,165* 
PRODUCT 0,039** 0,049** 0,002 
APU 1,017 -0,199 1,358 
AMU 0,656 -0,585 1,277 
APR 0,523 -0,633 1,165 
PRICE 0,061 0,134*** -0,047 
(*), (**), (***) indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 41 




Table 14:  refers to the coefficients and relevant statistics for the regressions (1), (2) and (3). PERF 
refers to a composite performance indicator mixing financial and quality of service subindices, QUAL 
refers to the quality of service performance subindex, FIN to the financial performance subindex, 
PCONCESS is the variable measuring total number of years in the contract, REMAIN is the 
remaining number of years, CHANGE is the number of contractual changes in the contract, PUBLIC 
is a dummy variable with the value of 1 for public, state-owned entities, AREA is the number 
kilometres (in 1000km2) served by the entity, RESIDENCE is the number of residences (in 1000) 
served, PRODUCT indicates the performance quintile in terms of productivity and PRICE indicates 
the performance decile in terms of a price score index. APU is a dummy variable making the distintion 
between companies whose are of influence whether includes urban areas or not. AMU is a dummy 
variable categorizing companies with presence in medium urban areas, and APR a dummy variable for 
companies with presence in purely rural areas. 
 
 The final regressions are the ones performed using the sample of companies from the 
downstream water sector. In these regressions, the R-squared levels are also higher than on 
the overall sample regressions. The addition of 3 variables and the fact that the companies 
have more similar profiles might potentially explain this increase on the explained variance. 
 First of all, it is noticeable that in these regressions the financial performance seems to 
be a decisive factor for quality performance, and vice-versa. This might be explained by the 
intrinsic costumer basis differences between upstream and downstream companies. Upstream 
companies have as customers municipalities or downstream companies, resulting in a short 
customer base. Downstream companies have as costumers the individual consumers. Despite 
the fact that we are talking about an essential service like water, sanitation or urban waste 
management, and that these companies are monopolists, the majority of the eventual elasticity 
of consumption (even considering how low it certainly is) is put on the side of downstream 
companies, giving an extra weight to quality. Additionally, in downstream companies, just a 
small investment like a quick repair on a neighbourhood supply system might make a big 
difference in terms of quality for thousands of customers.  All this to say that in downstream 
companies, there is a more obvious and direct connection between the financial and quality 
performance. Another possible vector of influence is that costumers that are more satisfied 
might be more prone to pay on time their bills. Being bill collection and average collection 
period one of the biggest financial problems of this sector, a reduction of this period, as small 
as it is, might have an important financial impact. 
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 Once again the variables related to the period of concession (period of concession and 
remaining years of concession) present themselves as important to the overall performance. 
The signal of the coefficients is also coherent to the findings of previous regressions. The 
period of concession presents a positive coefficient, whereas the remaining years of 
concession show a negative one. As in both previous regressions analysed, it seems that 
longer periods of concession yield better performance levels. Performance also seems to be 
affected by the passage of time, with the experience factor possibly being an important factor 
for the fact that as the time for the end of the concession approaches, the performance of 
companies seems to be enhanced.  
 The number of contractual changes also shows up as a relevant variable for both 
financial and quality performance. Nonetheless, the findings are proof of the ambiguity of this 
variable. For the financial performance the coefficient is negative, indicating that fewer 
contractual changes result in better performance. For quality performance, it has the opposite 
signal, indicating that potentially more contractual changes result in increased quality 
performance. As said in the initial expectations, more contractual changes might mean a 
poorly designed contract, but it can also be positive if the outcome is increased productivity. 
This indicator has additional importance on the downstream level. Since local power is more 
influential on this fraction of the sector, the potential for poorly conceived contracts is higher, 
with financial gains for the concessionary that are not proportional quality wise, with the 
negative coefficient for financial performance possibly meaning that those differences are 
corrected in contractual changes. Nevertheless, the positive coefficient for quality 
performance also might mean that regulators and the state holding are aware of the situation 
and intervene when necessary to fix poorly performing contracts. 
 For quality performance, the number of residences also showed up to be a relevant 
variable, with a negative coefficient. As it seems by this regression, fewer residences might 
mean increased service quality. Possibly structures close to over usage perform worse and 
with a larger customer base, customer service might get less accurate and repairs take longer 
to perform.  Nevertheless, this finding is not 100% coherent with findings about dimension on 
previous regressions. 
 Productivity also showed up as a significant variable for the downstream sample, 
being relevant for both financial and overall performance. As expected, the coefficient is 
positive, meaning that more productive companies perform better at a financial and overall 
level. It is noticeable that productivity comes up as a significant variable in the downstream 
sample, where the exposure to private companies is greater. One of the main apparent 
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advantages of private participation is the increased productivity, even if sometimes leveraged 
by considerable layoffs, resulting in better per worker performance indicators. Even despite 
these debatable gains of productivity brought by private companies, it is not negligible the 
fact that productivity showed up as s significant variable for both the global sample and also 
the downstream sample, possibly corroborating the hypothesis that private participation yields 
in fact productivity gains.  
 Price score was also significant for financial performance, but this time with a positive 
coefficient, meaning that higher prices result in an increased financial performance. Assuming 
an inelastic demand, coeteris paribus, a price increase would result in increased cash flows. 
Nevertheless, the findings for the previous regressions about price and also the initial 
expectation tend to make us believe that a lower price strategy is more successful in the water 























 Following the results analysis, some conclusions can be drawn in response to the 
primary objectives of this thesis. 
 At first sight, looking at the results, a strong case is built in favour of the period of 
concession and also the remaining period of concession. The period of concession showed up 
as a relevant variable 7 times on the total of the 9 regressions computed. It was a constant 
presence on the regressions where the overall performance was the dependent variable, but 
also ended up being related to both the financial and the quality performance. Even more 
relevant than the number of appearances, it is even more remarkable that the coefficient’s 
signal was positive in 6 of those cases. Therefore, using the findings from this study, it is 
prudent to say that the period of concession in years has an impact on the performance of 
concession on the water sector. Furthermore, it is backed up by evidence on this sample that 
the longer the period of concession, the greater the performance. 
 Even though periods of concessions are usually long, the fact that even longer periods 
are attributed to the company might work as a confidence statement on the management 
capabilities of that concession, also allowing it to develop longer-term plans. Given that the 
water industry requires huge investments on a water network development and management, 
and that the sector is heavily regulated, a longer period of concession also brings more 
guarantees to the company that they’ll end up having a return on investment, therefore 
increasing their appeal to invest. 
 Another variable that was recurrent was the remaining period of concession. This 
variable was considered significant on 8 of the 9 regressions, being present in all the 3 kinds 
of performance as well. The coefficient signal across these regressions was also constantly 
negative. Interpreting these negative coefficients tells us that as the remaining number of 
years of concession decreases, performance increases.  
 The analysis of this conclusion has essentially two sides. The first one, with a more 
positive outlook, indicates that the simple passing of time increases the performance of the 
company. As time goes by companies move on the learning curve, get more experienced, 
understand the business better and better, and apply all that knowledge being able to obtain 
significant efficiency gains and customer satisfaction, therefore increasing their financial 
structure and quality of service. Furthermore, at the final stages of the concession, 
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investments start paying off, and the property plant and equipment structure is increasingly 
stable, contributing to a more balanced financial structure.  
 Another analysis might indicate that as the time for a possible contract renegotiation 
or extension approaches, companies increase their efforts, in order to take advantage of the 
last period performance bias, and therefore be better positioned to ensure a new contract. 
 These two variables were the ones that presented the more solid and relevant results, 
but besides the initial period and the remaining years of concession, some other variables are 
noteworthy.  
 Price Score showed up on 4 of the 9 regressions. It was present on all the financial 
performance regressions indicating, as expected, that price as an impact on the financial 
performance. However, for the global and upstream samples the coefficient was negative, 
whereas for the downstream sample it was positive. Price score also showed up as a 
significant variable on the overall performance regression for the upstream sample, also with 
a negative coefficient. 
 Despite this small contradiction, evidence still ends up suggesting some importance 
for the price variable. This is curious taking into account the particularities of the sector being 
analysed, because it is a sector with no competition, since all the companies have local 
monopolies on the services provided.  
 Even though the coefficient’s signal was not unanimous throughout all the 
regressions, there is still relevant evidence that companies with lower prices perform better, at 
least financially. Taking into account the characteristics of the sector, such as high price 
regulation and monopolist structure this is not an easily explainable situation. Nonetheless, 
lower prices might for example reduce customer’s worries with water saving and end up 
increasing consumption to levels above needed. As a final review, data indicates that 
companies benefit from adopting a lower price policy, with possibly higher quantities. One 
other possible explanation might come from the connection between tariffs and area of 
influence. Tariffs are fixed and defined each year, depending on the cash flows needed to 
maintain the operation. Therefore, companies with lower maintenance structure and with a 
lower cost per costumer will probably have lower tariffs. As mentioned during this study, 
those are the characteristics of companies in urban areas, with several costumers, that benefit 
from efficiency gains and scale economies. In that sense, the indirect connection between the 
variables might help to explain this situation. 
 The numbers for productivity are also noticeable. In 4 cases this variable showed up 
with a positive coefficient indicating that more productive companies have increased 
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performance. Nevertheless, this variable never showed up as explanatory for quality 
performance. Due to the calculation being made as activity level divided by number of 
employees, and revenues and staff costs being two of the most important items of results 
analysis, it makes sense that the impact is more financial related. Once again, it is important 
to highlight that using the downstream sample productivity showed up as a significant 
variable, whereas in the upstream sample it did not. Taking into account that in the 
downstream sector private participation is higher, this might corroborate that independently of 
the mechanisms used to increase productivity, private sector parties’ end up bringing some 
extra productivity to the table. Even questioning the usual layoffs, it is also known that public 
structures are usually over staffed and don’t apply reasonable criteria of meritocracy for 
selection. Given this, possibly some of those layoffs and structure reduction end up creating a 
more balanced and reasonable structure to the needs of the company. 
 For the remaining variables the results are isolated and sometimes even contradictory, 
so they are considered not relevant for conclusions. 
 The main objective of this thesis was to assess which were some of the drivers 
influencing performance on the water sector, and to do this working already with the findings 
of previous studies as a basis. Almost at the same level there was the objective to understand, 
if possible, if there is a proved better management structure to provide quality service to the 
final customer – private or public.  
 Relative to the first objective, some solid conclusions were reached on what concerns 
the period of concession and also the remaining years of concession. If these conclusions are 
corroborated by future studies, it might bring additional value to the methodology of contract 
negotiations. 
 In terms of the second objective, no clear evidence was obtained about the best 
management model, even considering that some findings corroborate the hypothesis that 
private participants enhance productivity Nevertheless, this incognita is aligned with the 
findings of previous studies already described on the Literature Review. The private entrance 
on the water sector had some proved advantages, especially in terms of productivity, but still 
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Possible further studies 
 
 One of the major issues while studying the Portuguese water sector is still data 
availability. A lot has been done on recent years, but still there are some information gaps 
when trying to build long databases.  
 One of the suggestions for further studies is of course to increase the database, 
especially because the report of ERSAR from 2012 is the most complete one, but the previous 
ones lack information on several concessions.  
 The inclusion of more observations could also allow for a separation of water and 
waste management services. Since these services have different dynamics and scales, having 
the possibility to have considerable individual samples for both could also bring some 
interesting conclusions. 
 Another possible relevant addition is to find data on the municipalities that run 
themselves the water sector services on the city/town, which are still a very big number. As a 
pure example of public management, and more important, local public management, the 
introduction of these samples to the overall scenario could yield important findings and 
contribute to the public vs. private management debate. 
   With the data available in terms of geographical conditions only the variables APU, 
AMU and APR could be built. A possible improvement would be to elaborate more on the 
creation of a single variable for terrain conditions and infrastructure, since the potential for 
this variable is still probably underrated with the study that was conducted on this thesis. A 
more accurate variable related to this dimension could even help raise findings to a better 
planning of the areas of influence of companies, launching the debate if the current “micro” 
management structure is sustainable and effective or if there would be noticeable gains in 
merging structures and companies. 
 In terms of evaluation of private vs. public management, a more complete study could 
also involve finding solid comparable information between companies in full private models 
(such as in Britain and Wales), and studying their financial and specially quality performance 
comparing to companies in the hybrid “French” model, also similar to the one applied in 
Portugal. That would be a direct comparison between private and public management, and 
could yield more solid and interesting results for this debate.    
 As final remark, the introduction of new hypothetical drivers for performance is also a 
value added idea, when the lack of good data is surpassed. 
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Equity Ratio Equity / Assets 
Exploration Margin Operational Profit / Revenues 
Permanent Capital Coverage Operational Profit / Permanent Capital 
Capitalization Equity / Share Capital 
ACP Average Collection Period 
% owned by AdP on the concession   
 





Occurence of failures on the network 
Water safe for consumption 
Coverage Ratio 
Unbilled Water 
Reabilitation of distribution networks 
Suitability of Human Resources 
Respect of legal parameters 
Table 16 – List of Quality and Sustainability Indicators used on the Concession Performance 
Evaluation Model 
Note: On the Quality and Sustainability part, these were not the exact indicators used. The indicators used are 
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Variables’ descriptive statistics 
 
 




Table 18 – Descriptive Statistics for Upstream Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Performance 321 3,138 0,539 1,7 4,89
Financial Performance 321 3,738 0,678 2 5,00
Quality Performance 321 2,739 0,672 1 5,00
Period of Concession 281 30,402 6,934 15 50
Remaining Years of Concession 281 21,566 9,161 5 50
Contractual Changes 321 0,389 0,603 0 2
Public vs Private Management 321 0,586 0,493 0 1
Area served (km2) 313 1996,160 2695,335 2 17037
Nº of Residences (000) 313 155,600 216,127 1,5 1142
Productivity 318 5,586 2,815 1 10
Price Score 321 2,903 1,310 1 5
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Performance 170 3,051 0,533 1,871 4,657
Financial Performance 170 3,641 0,699 2,140 5
Quality Performance 170 2,659 0,667 1 5
Period of Concession 156 30,051 6,698 20 50
Remaining Years of Concession 156 20,718 9,032 5 50
Contractual Changes 170 0,218 0,455 0 2
Public vs. Private Management 170 0,906 0,293 0 1
Area served (km2) 166 3461,825 2966,430 2 17037
Nº of Residences (000) 168 257,889 252,393 15 1142
Productivity 170 5,506 2,909 1 10
Price Score 170 2,891 1,415 1 5
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Table 19 – Descriptive Statistics for Downstream Variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Performance 152 3,232 0,531 1,7 4,886
Financial Performance 152 3,846 0,637 2 5
Quality Performance 152 2,823 0,669 1,5 5
Period of Concession 125 30,840 7,222 15 50
Remaining Years of Concession 125 22,624 9,247 5 49
Contractual Changes 152 0,579 0,686 0 2
Public vs. Private Management 152 0,230 0,422 0 1
Area served (km2) 147 341,054 615,942 8 6498
Nº of Residences (000) 146 37,684 32,024 1,5 180,5
Productivity 149 5,648 2,728 1 10
APU 152 0,250 0,434 0 1
AMU 152 0,507 0,502 0 1
APR 152 0,263 0,442 0 1
Price Score 152 2,918 1,183 1 5
